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1 Introduction
Japan had a typical mixed economy1 in which public enterprises long played a leading role. For example, many
believed that lending by public financial institutions such as the Development Bank of Japan had a pump-priming
effect on private bank lending. Furthermore, public financing occupied an important position in Japan’s financial
markets for over 60 years since the 1940s, and public and private financial institutions still coexist.2
However, the Koizumi Cabinet (April 2001–September 2006) changed this by declaring that public firms
should play a complementary role to private firms, with the latter leading the markets rather than the former.
Consequently, major public institutions were substantially downsized (Matsumura and Ogawa, 2017).
We can describe this situation with Pal’s (1998) mixed oligopoly model with private leadership.3 He examined
a model in which one public firm competes against private firms by adopting the observable delay game formu-
lated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and investigating the endogenous role in mixed oligopolies. He showed that
private leadership (in which all private firms are Stackelberg leaders and one public firm is Stackelberg follower)
yields greater welfare than public leadership does and that the private firms become the leaders and the public
firm becomes the follower in equilibrium if the number of private firms is large. Although both public and private
leadership equilibria exist in a mixed duopoly (i.e., the number of private firms is one), he suggested that private
leadership is more natural and robust. Subsequently, many researchers proved his conclusion adequate. Mat-
sumura and Ogawa (2010) showed that private leadership is risk-dominant in Pal’s (1998) duopoly model. They
also adopted Matsumura’s (1998) partial privatization approach and showed the advantage of private leadership;
that is, the range of the degree of privatization that yields a private leadership equilibrium is wider than that for
the public leadership equilibrium. Capuano and De Feo (2010) introduced the shadow cost of public funds into
Pal’s (1998) duopoly model and showed that unless the shadow cost is too high, one of the following results holds:
(i) the unique equilibrium is a private leadership equilibrium or (ii) both public and private leadership equilibria
1For a recent discussion of mixed oligopoly, see Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Nakamura (2015a,b), Chen (2017), and the works
they cite.
2See Horiuchi and Sui (1993). Even before the 1940s, public financial institutions played an important role in Japan. In the
international trade finance market, Yokohama Specie Bank competed with HSBC, a major foreign private bank, and obtained a
major share of the market. The public sector worldwide has an important role in lending markets; see Bose et al. (2014).
3See Ino and Matsumura (2010) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2017).
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exist and the private leadership equilibrium is risk-dominant.4 Matsumura (2003a) used a different endogenous
timing game (two-production period game) formulated by Saloner (1987) and Pal (1991) and showed that only
the private leadership equilibrium is robust.5 Ino and Matsumura (2010) showed that in the free entry market,
welfare is greater in the private leadership model than in the public leadership and the simultaneous-move models.
From these results, it is reasonable to focus on the private leadership model in mixed oligopolies.
The Koizumi Cabinet also planned to privatize most of the major public financial institutions. However, the
subsequent cabinets in Japan postponed the privatization of public financial institutions such as the Development
Bank of Japan and the Japan Finance Corporation, which play a complementary role to private banks, and keeps
a 100 % share in them (Matsumura and Ogawa, 2017).6 In this study, we investigate whether the government
need not privatize public firms as long as these are followers and the private firms are leaders.
We study the optimal degree of privatization in Stackelberg mixed oligopolies in which private firms are
leaders.7 While many studies investigated Stackelberg mixed oligopolies with private leadership, few discussed
the optimal privatization policy.8 In contrast, there is significant research on the optimal degree of privatization
in Cournot mixed oligopolies. Matsumura (1998) showed that unless full nationalization of a public firm yields a
public monopoly, the optimal degree of privatization in mixed duopolies is never zero under fairy general demand
and cost conditions. Lin and Matsumura (2012) showed that the optimal degree of privatization increases with
the number of private firms in two popular models of mixed oligopolies: the linear cost and quadratic cost models.
Matsumura and Kanda (2005) showed that the optimal degree of privatization is zero in free entry markets, while
4If the shadow cost is high, the unique equilibrium is a Cournot equilibrium.
5However, this result depends on the assumption of quantity competition. Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) showed that the simultaneous-
move outcome appears under price competition in the observable delay game. In addition, Matsumura (2003b) showed that even
under quantity competition, public leadership can be a unique equilibrium if the private firm has only foreign owners. Tomaru and
Saito (2010) introduced a production subsidy policy in a mixed duopoly and showed that under private leadership, the government
minimizes the subsidy rate to achieve an efficient outcome. This may be another advantage of private leadership.
6In contrast, the government partially privatized the Postal Bank and Kampo, which compete with private banks and life-insurance
companies.
7There are two reasons we focus on private leadership. One is that it is a natural outcome. First, as is discussed above, the
private leadership in which all private firms produce first and then one public firm produces always constitutes an equilibrium and it
is the unique equilibrium when the number of private firms exceeds three (Pal,1998, Jacques, 2004). Second, our research question
is investigating whether or not the government need not privatize the public firm as long as it plays a complementary role as the
follower. If the answer is yes, this fact rationalizes the current privatization policy in Japan.
8Matsumura and Ogawa (2010) and Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2010) investigated endogenous timing in mixed duopolies under
partial privatization, but did not discuss the optimal degree of privatization.
3
it is never zero if the number of firms is given exogenously.
In this study, we compare the privatization policy implications of private leadership and Cournot mixed
oligopolies. We examine two popular models in the literature on mixed oligopolies: the linear cost and quadratic
cost models. We find that when marginal cost is constant, the optimal degree of privatization is zero under
private leadership, in contrast to the result in Cournot mixed oligopolies. This may support the recent Japanese
privatization policy: the government should keep 100% share in the public firm as long as it plays a complementary
role to the private sector. When the marginal cost is increasing, however, the optimal degree of privatization is
never zero, and full privatization can be optimal. These results suggest that the optimal privatization policy
depends on the cost conditions, and full nationalization is not always optimal, even under private leadership.
Finally, we investigate the case with symmetric quadratic costs between public and private firms. We find that
the optimal degree of privatization is substantially lower under private leadership than in the simultaneous-move
model.
2 The Model
Consider a market in which one (partially privatized) domestic state-owned public firm, firm 0, competes against n
private firms. Firm 0 maximizes the weighted average of domestic social surplus and its own profit, αpi0+(1−α)W ,
where α ∈ [0, 1] indicates the degree of privatization. If α = 0, firm 0 is fully nationalized. If α = 1, it is fully
privatized. All other firms (firm 1 ,..., firm n) maximize their own profits.9
Firms produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which p(Q) denotes the inverse demand function, p is
the price, and Q is total output. We assume that p is twice continuously differentiable and that p′ < 0 and p′′ ≤ 0
as long as p > 0.10 Firm 0’s cost function is c0(q0). All private firms have identical cost functions c(qi). We
9This is a standard model formulation of partial privatization in the literature on mixed oligopoly. We do not allow the government
to nationalize both firms. As Merrill and Schneider (1966) pointed out, the most efficient outcome is achieved by the nationalization of
all firms if nationalization does not change the firms’ costs. The need to analyze mixed oligopolies lies in the fact that it is impossible
or undesirable, for political or economic reasons, to nationalize an entire sector. For example, without a competitor, public firms may
lose the incentive to improve their costs, resulting in a loss of social welfare. Thus, we neglect the possibility of nationalizing all firms.
10The assumption p′′ ≤ 0 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for our results. It guarantees the relevant stability and
second-order conditions.
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assume c′0, c
′′
0 , c
′, and c′′ ≥ 0.
The profit of firm 0 is given by pi0 = p(Q)q0− c0(q0), and that of firm i (= 1, . . . , n) is pii = p(Q)qi− c(qi). We
define social welfare as
W =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq − pQ+
n∑
i=0
pii. (1)
Firm 0 maximizes (1 − α)W + αpi0. In the full nationalization case (i.e., α = 0), firm 0 maximizes social
welfare. In the full privatization case (i.e., α = 1), firm 0 maximizes its own profit. The degree of privatization is
measured by α.
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses α ∈ [0, 1] to maximize W . In the second
stage, after observing α, each firm i (i = 1, 2, ...n) chooses qi independently. In the third stage, after observing
the private firms’ output, firm 0 chooses q0. Throughout this study, we use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
as the equilibrium concept.
Before discussing the private leadership model, we present the results of a simultaneous-move game as a
benchmark.11 In the simultaneous-move model, the government chooses α ∈ [0, 1], and after observing α, each
firm i (i = 0, 1, ...n) chooses qi independently.
Result (Matsumura, 1998) Suppose that all public and private firms choose their output simultaneously.
Suppose that the output of each private firm is positive, even when α = 0. Then, α = 0 is never optimal.
In the following sections, we adopt one model with linear costs (constant marginal costs) and another with
linear demand and quadratic cost functions.
3 The model with constant marginal costs
In this section, we assume constant marginal costs. The marginal cost for firm 0 is z and that of each private
firm is normalized to zero. We assume that z > 0. In other words, we assume that the public firm is less efficient
than the private firm and z is a measure of the public firm’s cost disadvantage.12 Let pp be the private Cournot
11Matsumura (1998) showed this result for duopolies and Matsumura and Kanda (2005) showed it for oligopolies.
12This is a very popular model in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See Pal (1998) and Matsumura (2003a). If z ≤ 0, the public
monopoly appears in equilibrium, and the equilibrium α is zero, regardless of the timing of production (simultaneous-move, public
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equilibrium price in a game where firm 0 exits the market and n private firms face Cournot competition. We
assume that pp > z. Otherwise, firm 0 produces nothing, regardless of α, and thus any α is optimal.
In the third stage, firm 0 chooses q0 given the private firms’ output Q−0 :=
∑n
i=1 qi. Let Q
∗ be the output
satisfying p(Q∗) = z. Obviously, if Q∗ − Q−0 ≤ 0, firm 0 chooses q0 = 0, regardless of α. Suppose that
Q∗ −Q−0 > 0. The first-order condition of firm 0 is
p+ αp′q0 − z = 0; (2)
the second-order condition is satisfied. Let R0 be the reaction function of firm 0 derived from (2). We obtain
R′0 = −
p′ + p′′αq0
p′ + αp′ + αp′′q0
∈ [−1, 0) (3)
and R′0 = −1 if and only if α = 0.
In the second stage, each firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) chooses qi independently. The first-order condition is
p+ (1 +R′0)p
′qi = 0. (4)
If α = 0, R′0 = −1 as long as Q∗ − Q−0 ≥ 0. Thus, each private firm behaves as a price taker as long as
Q∗ − Q−0 ≥ 0 because the price is independent of its output level. Therefore, Q∗ − Q−0 must be zero because
a private firm has the incentive to increase its output otherwise. This is optimal for social welfare because more
efficient firms produce all units, and obviously the private firms will never produce more for any α. Therefore, in
the first stage, the government chooses α = 0. This leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Under private leadership, α = 0 is optimal for social welfare (and thus the government chooses
it) in the constant marginal cost model.
This result is in sharp contrast to that in Matsumura’s (1998) simultaneous-move model, in which α = 0 is
optimal only when the private firms produce nothing (public monopoly). In contrast, under private leadership
(when the public firm is the Stackelberg follower), full nationalization is optimal. This result suggests that if
leadership, or private leadership models). To avoid such an obvious result, we assume z > 0.
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the public firm complements the private sector, the government need not privatize it. We explain the intuition.
In both simultaneous-move and private leadership models, if α = 0, then the equilibrium price is equal to the
public firm’s marginal cost z. However, in the simultaneous-move model, each private firm chooses its output by
considering that an increase in output reduces the price, given the other firms’ output. Because strategies are
strategic substitutes, the public firm’s aggressive behavior caused by α = 0 reduces the equilibrium output of
each private firm, resulting in a welfare loss.13
In the private leadership model, each private firm recognizes that an increase in its output reduces the public
firm’s output. This strategic effect is stronger when the slope of the reaction curve of firm 0 is steeper. This
strategic effect is the strongest when α = 0, and thus, α = 0 induces the most aggressive behavior (the largest
output) in each private firm, in contrast to the simultaneous-move model. This leads to Proposition 1.
4 Alternative model: Quadratic costs and linear demand
In this section, we analyze another popular model in the literature. The inverse demand function is p(Q) = a−Q,
where a is a positive constant, p is the price, and Q is the total output. Let the cost function of firm 0 be
c0(q0) = (k0/2)q
2
0 and that of firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) be ci(qi) = (k/2)q
2
i , where k0, k > 0.
14 We restrict our
attention to a symmetric equilibrium in which all private firms produce the same output.15
Given Q−0, firm 0 maximizes αpi0 + (1− α)W. The first-order condition is
p+ αp′q0 − k0q0 = a−Q−0 − (1 + α+ k0)q0 = 0; (5)
13A smaller α makes the public firm more aggressive because it is more concerned with total social surplus, including consumer
surplus, and it thus has more incentive to reduce the price-cost margin through a larger output.
14Models with linear demand and a quadratic cost function are popular in this field. See Matsumura and Shimizu (2010) and the
works they cite. We allow both the case where the public firm is less efficient than private firms (k0 > k) and the case where the
public firm is as efficient as private firms (k0 = k). Whether public firms are less efficient than private firms is a controversial issue.
Some empirical works support the former view and other works support the latter. Thus, we assume k0 ≥ k to allow both cases.
Moreover, we intentionally avoid assuming k0 = k and discuss more general costs than De Fraja and Delbono (1989). If we assume
k0 = k, it may not be clear that the contrasting results from Propositions 1 and 2 depend on whether the public firm is less efficient
or equally efficient, rather than whether the marginal costs are increasing or constant. We use our model formulation to avoid a
possible misunderstanding.
15We can show that no asymmetric equilibrium exits in this model.
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the second-order condition is satisfied. From (5), we obtain firm 0’s reaction function:
R0(Q−0, α) =
a−Q−0
1 + α+ k0
. (6)
In the first stage, each firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) choses qi independently. The first-order condition is
p+ (1 +R′0)p
′qi − kqi = a−Q−
(
k +
α+ k0
1 + α+ k0
)
qi = 0; (7)
the second-order condition is satisfied.
Let q∗(α) be the equilibrium output of each private firm, q∗0(α) be that of the public firm (firm 0), and
Q∗(α) := nq∗ + q∗0 be the equilibrium total output. From (6), (7), and the equation Q
∗ = nq∗ + q∗0 , we obtain
q∗(α) =
(α+ k0)a
(n+ 1)(α+ k0) + (1 + α+ k0)k
. (8)
q∗0(α) = a
α+ k0 + (1 + α+ k0)k
(1 + α+ k0)((n+ 1)(α+ k0) + (1 + α+ k0)k)
. (9)
From these equations, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 q∗0(α) and Q
∗(α) is decreasing in α, and q∗ is increasing in α.
Proof See the Appendix.
These are common results for the simultaneous-move model. An increase in α reduces the optimal output
for firm 0 given the output of private firms because firm 0 is less concerned with consumer surplus (Matsumura,
1998). This effect reduces q∗0 , and through the strategic interaction, it increases q
∗. An increase in α has another
effect under private leadership: it makes the slope of the reaction curve of firm 0 less steep because the public
firm is less concerned with consumer surplus, and thus has less incentive to make up the private firms’ insufficient
supply. This effect makes the private leaders less aggressive, and through the strategic interaction, increases the
output of firm 0. The former effect dominates the latter under the linear demand and quadratic cost model.
Therefore, q∗0 is decreasing in α and q
∗ is increasing in α.16
16The effect on the slope of the reaction curve crucially depends on the property of firm 0’s cost function because an increase in α
makes firm 0 less aggressive given the other firms’ output. This reduces the marginal cost of firm 0 when marginal cost is increasing,
and this makes firm 0 more aggressive. Consequently, the reaction function effect mentioned above is partially canceled when marginal
cost is increasing, and thus, this effect is weakened. This is why the reaction function effect is weaker in the increasing marginal cost
model than in the constant marginal cost model.
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Let W ∗(α) be the welfare when q0 = q∗0 and q1 = q2 = ... = qn = q
∗. We obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 ∂W ∗(α)/∂α|α=0 > 0 regardless of k0 and k.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that full nationalization of firm 0 is never optimal, a sharp contrast to Proposition 1.
We now explain the intuition behind Proposition 2. Suppose that α = 0. Then, firm 0 chooses q0 to maximize
welfare given q∗. In other words, the price must be equal to firm 0’s marginal cost. On the other hand, each
private firm chooses q to maximize its own profit, and as expected, q is too small for welfare maximization (i.e.,
the price is higher than the marginal cost of each private firm). Suppose that α increases slightly. The increase
in α reduces q∗0 and increases q
∗. Since q∗0 is optimal for welfare when α = 0, the decrease in q
∗
0 reduces welfare
but has a second-order effect on welfare (envelope theorem). In other words, ∂W/∂q0 = 0.
17
Finally, we consider the case in which public and private firms have the same cost function (i.e., k0 = k = 1).
The welfare function under private leadership is
W (α) =
(1 + α)(n2(1 + α)(2 + α)2 + 2(3 + 2α)2 + n(2 + α)2(5 + 3α))
2(2 + α)2(3 + n+ 2α+ nα)2
. (10)
The first-order condition is18
∂W (α)
∂α
= −α(3 + 2α)
3 + n(−4 + 3α+ 15α2 + 12α3 + 3α4)
(2 + α)3(3 + n+ 2α+ nα)3
= 0. (11)
The second-order condition
−2(1− α)(3 + 2α)4 + 3n2(−14− 22α− 4α2 + 12α3 + 9α4 + 2α5) + n(−156− 240α+ 200α3 + 135α4 + 28α5)
(2 + α)4(3 + n+ 2α+ nα)4
< 0
17This principle can apply to the Cournot model (simultaneous quantity choice model) but not to the public leadership model.
When the public firm is the Stackelberg leader, the choice of q0 directly affects the choice of q and the public firm chooses q0
considering this strategic effect. In contrast, because q∗ is too small for welfare when α = 0, the increase in q∗ improves welfare and
has a first-order effect on welfare. Therefore, the latter welfare-improving effect dominates the former welfare-reducing effect. This
yields Proposition 2. Note that this principle cannot apply to a model with constant marginal cost. In this case, we find the corner
solution (i.e., q0 = 0 in equilibrium) under private leadership. Moreover, an increase in α does not increase each private firm’s output.
Thus, our discussion above cannot apply to the constant marginal cost model.
18This occurs because ∂W/∂α > 0 when α = 0 and ∂W/∂α < 0 when α = 1, and the solution is interior (i.e., partial privatization
is optimal).
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is satisfied for n ≥ 1 and α ∈ [0, 1]. Because the denominator in (11) is positive, the first-order condition is satisfied
if and only if the numerator in (11) is zero. Solving this equation, we have two imaginary number solutions, one
negative real number solution, and one positive real number solution. The last solution is the optimal degree of
privatization. The lower curve in Figure 1 describes the relationship between the number of private firms and the
optimal degree of privatization.19
***********************************************************************
Insert Figure 1 here
***********************************************************************
We now compare this solution to that in the simultaneous-move model. The welfare function in the simultaneous-
move model is
W (α) =
(1 + α)(8 + n2(1 + α) + n(7 + 3α))
2(4 + n+ 2α+ nα)2
. (12)
The first-order condition is20
∂W (α)
∂α
= − 2(n(−1 + α) + 4α)
(4 + n+ 2α+ nα)3
= 0. (13)
The second-order condition
−4n
2(2− α) + n(7− 6α) + 8(1− α)
(4 + n+ 2α+ nα)4
< 0 (14)
is satisfied for n ≥ 1 and α ∈ [0, 1]. Because the denominator in (13) is positive, the first-order condition is
satisfied if and only if the numerator in (13) is zero. Solving this equation, we obtain the following solution.
α =
n
4 + n
. (15)
The upper curve in Figure 1 describes the relationship between the number of private firms and the optimal
degree of privatization.
19Presenting the solution explicitly requires a rather complicated and messy exposition of about one page. We believe that presenting
it is not useful for most readers and thus we omit it. It is available from the authors upon request.
20Because ∂W/∂α > 0 when α = 0 and ∂W/∂α < 0 when α = 1, so the solution is interior (i.e., partial privatization is optimal).
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From Figure 1, we find that
(a) the optimal degree of privatization is increasing with the number of the private firms in both the private
leadership and simultaneous-move models;
(b) the optimal degree of privatization is lower in the private leadership model than that in the simultaneous-move
model; and
(c) the optimal degree of privatization is less sensitive to the number of private firms in the private leadership
model than in the simultaneous-move model.
In addition, we can show that the optimal degree of privatization converges to one as n → ∞ in the
simultaneous-move model, while the upper bound of the optimal degree of privatization is less than 0.4 (about
0.378663) under private leadership.
These findings contain rich implications. First, the more private firms exist in the market, the more the
government should privatize the public firm, even under private leadership. Second, the government should
privatize less if the public firm is the follower. Third, the optimal ownership share in the public firm can be
close to zero in the simultaneous-move model when the number of the private firms is sufficiently large, while the
government should hold a substantial share in the public firm if the public firm is the follower.
We now explain the intuition behind these results. We first address the property (a) in the simultaneous-move
model above. Lin and Matsumura (2012) and Matsumura and Okamura (2015) showed that the optimal degree of
privatization is increasing with the number of private firms in the simultaneous-move model. As we stated above,
a larger α induces production substitution from the public firm to the private firms. As long as the marginal cost
is higher in the public firm than in each private firm (i.e., the public firm produces more than the private firms
do), the production substitution improves production efficiency in the industry and thus improves welfare. We
call this the “production-substitution effect.” At the same time, an increase in α reduces total output, and thus
reduces welfare. We call this the “total output effect.” When the number of private firms is larger, the output of
each private firm is smaller, and thus the marginal cost for each private firm is smaller. Therefore, the higher the
number of private firms, the stronger the welfare improving production-substitution effect is. When the number
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of private firms is larger, the total output is larger, and thus the welfare loss caused by a reduction in total output
is smaller. These two effects yield the above first property (a), and a similar principle can apply to the private
leadership model.
However, under private leadership, another effect exits. An increase in α reduces the slope of the public firm’s
reaction curve because the public firm is less concerned with consumer surplus, and thus has less incentive to
make up for the private firms’ insufficient supply. This weakens the leaders’ strategic behavior and makes the
private firms less aggressive, resulting in a welfare loss. Therefore, the government chooses a smaller degree of
privatization when the public firm is the follower in order to stimulate the private leaders’ production. This leads
to the second property (b) mentioned above. We call this the “reaction function effect.”
The reaction function effect is more significant when the number of leaders is larger. As the number of
private firms increases, the positive production-substitution effect strengthens, the negative total production
effect weakens, and the negative reaction function effect increases. The first and second effects have the opposite
direction of the third effect, and they are canceled out. The first and second effects work in both the simultaneous-
move and private leadership models, whereas the third effect works in the private leadership model only. Therefore,
under private leadership, the optimal degree of privatization is less sensitive to the number of the private firms,
and the government should hold a substantial share in the private firm due to the third effect, even when the
number of private firms is large. This leads the third property (c) mentioned above.
5 Concluding remarks
In this study, we discuss the optimal degree of privatization in mixed Stackelberg oligopolies in which the private
firms are leaders. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is zero if the marginal cost is constant. This
may support the current Japanese privatization policies. However, this result never holds if firms have quadratic
costs. Our results suggest that we should carefully check the policy implications of privatization policy in mixed
oligopolies, even if we adopt a popular model from the literature.
In this study, we assumed that the degree of privatization does not affect firms’ production costs. However, it
12
is possible that privatization can improve production efficiency, which then affects the resulting welfare. Incorpo-
rating this effect into mixed Stackelberg models is quite difficult, and we failed to derive clear-cut results. This
task remains for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 From (8) and (9), we obtain
∂q∗
∂α
=
ak
((1 + n)(k0 + α) + k(1 + k0 + α))2
> 0,
∂q∗0
∂α
= −a ((1 + n)(k0 + α)
2 + k2(1 + k0 + α)
2 + k(1 + k0 + α)(n+ k0(2 + n) + (2 + n)α)
(1 + k0 + α)2((1 + n)(k0 + α) + k(1 + k0 + α))2
< 0,
∂Q∗
∂α
= n
∂q∗
∂α
+
∂q∗0
∂α
= −a ((1 + n)(k0 + α)
2 + k2(1 + k0 + α)
2 + 2k(k0 + k
2
0 + α+ 2k0α+ α
2)
(1 + k0 + α)2((1 + n)(k0 + α) + k(1 + k0 + α))2
< 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider the welfare function W (q∗0(α), q
∗(α)).
∂W
∂α
= (p− c′0)
∂q∗0
∂α
+ n(p− c′)∂q
∗
∂α
, (16)
where c′0(= k0q0) and c
′(= kq) are the marginal costs for public and private firms, respectively. From the first-
order condition of firm 0, we obtain p − c′0 = 0 when α = 0. Thus, the first term in (16) is zero. From the
first-order condition of each private firm i, we obtain p− c′ = −p′(1+R′0)qi > 0 because R′0 = −1/(1+ k0) > −1.
Because ∂q∗/∂α > 0 (Lemma 1), (16) is positive when α = 0. This implies Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
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